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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Howard Locke appeals from his judgment of conviction asserting that the 
. Mr. Locke asserts that his 
second DUI conviction should not have been enhanced to a felony because he did not 
have two prior DUI convictions when he committed the second DUI offense. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On October 19, 2007, Mr. Locke was arrested for his first DUI offense. 
(R., p.52.) A few months later, on March 20, 2008, Mr. Locke drove a motor vehicle 
with a BAC amount greater than the legal limited and committed the instant offense (his 
second DUI). (R., pp.45-46.) Nearly two months later, the Boise City Attorney's Office 
accused Mr. Locke by Complaint with a misdemeanor DUI, in the district court. 
(R., pp.07-08.) A summons was authorized to be issued. (R., p.09.) Mr. Locke was 
served the summons on June 11, 2008, and arraigned on July 9, 2008. (R., p.3.) The 
court scheduled the jury trial for October 23, 2008. (R., p.3.) Between the time he was 
served with the summons on the second DUI and before the arraignment date, 
Mr. Locke had been arrested on a third DUI. (R., p.52.) 
On October 7, 2008, the State filed an amended complaint in the instant case. 
(R., pp.11-12.) The prosecutor accused Mr. Locke of having a BAC in excess of .20, 
nevertheless continued to prosecute the offense as a misdemeanor. (R., pp.11-12.) 
The court bound Mr. Locke over and the prosecutor filed an Information charging 
Mr. Locke with felony DUI. (R., pp.45-46.) 
Mr. Locke filed a motion to dismiss asserting that it was factually impossible to 
have two prior guilty convictions on a second DUI offense. (R., pp.46-50.) Mr. Locke 
filed a memorandum in support. (R., pp.51-55.) The State objected and filed its 
memorandum in opposition. (R., pp.58-64.) The matter proceeded to a hearing. 
(R., p.65.) 
The district court denied Mr. Locke's motion finding that the plain language of the 
statute did not distinguish about when the offense took place, but instead when a 
person plead guilty. (R., pp.66-70.) Thereafter, Mr. Locke entered a conditional plea of 
guilty, preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
(R., pp.78-79.) The district court imposed upon Mr. Locke a unified sentence of ten 
years, with two years fixed, and suspended execution of the sentence, placing 
Mr. Locke on probation for ten years. (R., pp.82-87.) Mr. Locke timely appealed. 
(R., pp.88-90.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Locke's motion to dismiss because his 
second DUI should not have been enhanced because it is factually impossible to have 
two prior DUI convictions prior to the second DUI offense being committed? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Locke's Motion To Dismiss Because His 
Second DUI Should Not Have Been Enhanced Because It Is Factuallv Impossible To 
Have Two Prior DUI Convictions Prior To The Second DUI Offense Being Committed 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Locke asserts that because it is practically impossible to have two guilty DUI 
pleas prior to his second DUI offense, he could not be guilty of a felony DUI. 
6. Standard Of Review 
Construction and application of statutes are purely legal questions and, therefore, 
reviewing courts exercise free review. McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 135 ldaho 328, 332, 17 
P.2d 272, 276 (2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 ldaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997). When 
faced with the interpretation of a statute, the appellate court begins with an examination 
of the statute's literal words. State V. Burnight, 133 ldaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 
(1999). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. 
Beard, 135 ldaho 641,646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (2001). 
C. Mr. Locke Asserts That The Law And Statute Reauire Him To Have Been Found 
Guilty Of Two Prior DUI Offenses Before An Offense Mav Be Enhanced And 
Because The Instant Case Involves His Second DUI Offense It Is Virtually 
Impossible For Him To Have Committed Two Prior Offenses 
Mr. Locke asserts that the district court erred denying his motion to dismiss 
because at the moment he committed his second DUI offense, it was impossible for him 
to have had two prior DUI offenses, much less two guilty pleas or convictions. 
Mr. Locke recognizes that ldaho Code 318-8004 provides that: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs 
andlor any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, 
as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a 
highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the 
public. 
ldaho Code $18-8004 (2008). He further recognizes that any DUI offense beyond his 
second DUI offense committed within certain time periods could be enhanced to a 
felony DUI. ldaho Code $18-8005(5) provides: 
Except as provided in section 18-8004C, ldaho Code, any person who 
pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 
18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho Code, who previously has been found 
guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the provisions of 
section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho Code, or any substantially 
conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within 
ten (10) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld 
judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony. . . . 
ldaho Code $18-8005(5) (2008) (emphasis added). Thus, ldaho Code 318-8005(5) 
permits the enhancement of a third misdemeanor DUI to a felony where a defendant 
"has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the provisions 
of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho Code. . . ." Id. 
In State v. Craig, the ldaho Supreme Court answered the question of whether a 
second DUI conviction must precede a third DUI violation before the prosecuting 
attorney could charge the defendant with a felony DUI on the third violation. State v. 
Craig, I17  ldaho 983, 984, 793 P.2d 215, 216 (1990). The Craig Court found that the 
second DUI conviction did not have to precede the third violation. Id. at 217, 793 P.2d 
The instant case is distinguishable, however, because it is the second offense 
that the State wants to punish as the felony. In Craig, it's the third violation and the two 
prior offenses had already been committed before Craig committed the third offense. In 
1991, the ldaho Supreme Court recognized what Mr. Locke is attempting to argue, "The 
DUI statute requires only that there are two prior DUI convictions within the previous 
five years, for a third to constitute a felony with enhanced punishment." State v. 
Garrett, 119 ldaho 878, 886, 81 1 P.2d 488, 493 (1991) (the Court deemed it irrelevant 
that the State failed to charge Garrett with a "DUI, Second Offense). 
In State V. Scott, the ldaho Court of Appeals found that the statute identified a 
look back period from the date of the pending offense. State v. Scott, 135 ldaho 457, 
459, 19 P.3d 771, 773 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Pusey, 128 ldaho 647, 648, 917 
P.2d 804, 805 (Ct. App. 1996)). The Scott Court reversed the district court's decision to 
include a DUI offense that the defendant pled guilty to outside the look back period by a 
few days, but wherein that offense he was sentenced to within the designated look back 
period. Id. at 458, 19 P.3d at 770. Therefore, Scott's third DUI offense could not be 
enhanced because the Legislature deemed the guilty plea or conviction date to be the 
triggering event. Id. at 459-460, 19 P.3d at 773-74. 
The DUI enhancement statute is a recidivism statute that increases penalties for 
repeat behavior. State v. Lamb, 147 ldaho 133, 135, 206 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct. App. 
2009). Because the purpose of the statute is to treat repeat offenders more harshly, it is 
essential that the commission of other offenses take place prior to the enhancement 
being placed on the violation. See State v. Craig, 117 ldaho at 987, 793 P.2d at 219 
(Bistline, J., dissenting); Cf State v. Brandt, 110 ldaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 
1986) (noting that the purpose of the persistent violator laws is to punish repeat 
offenders more harshly). Before treating a repeat offender more harshly, "a defendant 
should be entitled to an opportunity to reform himself between convictions or that the 
persistent violator statute seeks to warn first time offenders." State v. Mace, 133 ldaho 
903, 906, 994 P2.d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Brandt, 110 ldaho at 
344, 715 P.2d at 1014) (finding that multiple convictions entered on the same day 
constituted a single conviction for purposes of the persistent violator statute). 
"The principle of lenity mandates that criminal statutes be read narrowly and, 
where ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward defendants." Stafe v. 
Harrington, 133 ldaho 563, 566, 990 P.2d 144, 147 (Ct. App. 1999). The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that a criminal statute must give fair 
warning of the conduct that it makes crimal. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 
350-52 (1964). The rule of lenity is considered a manifestation of the fair warning 
requirement under the right to due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265- 
66 (1997); see also Stafe v. Anderson, 145 ldaho 99, 175 P.3d 788 (2008) (citations 
omitted) ("The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in 
favor of defendants.") and State v. Shanks, 139 ldaho 152, 75 P.3d 206 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(recognizing the application of the rule of lenity to an ambiguous statute in ldaho). The 
United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous 
statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the 
premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the 
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair 
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have 
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute. 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas further spoke to this premise in a 
concurring opinion in United States v. R.I.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). They concluded 
"that it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal 
statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is 
determined that the statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient 
interpretation prevail." Id. at 293 (Scalia concurring). The Justices further stated that 
the consideration of legislative history "compromises the purposes of the lenity rule: to 
assure that the criminal statutes provide a fair warning of what conduct is considered 
illegal." Id. 
Moreover, Idaho, its citizens "are presumptively charged with knowledge of the 
law once the laws are passed." Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 
1211 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Afkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (applying the 
presumptive knowledge standard to a due process claim that a defendant was not given 
actual notice of a potential DUI enhancement).) Thus, if the due process notice 
requirement is satisfied merely by the passing of the law, where the law in the instant 
case is at best ambiguous, and most likely specifically excludes Mr. Locke's future 
conduct for purposes of an enhancement, this Court cannot find anyway but in favor of 
Mr. Locke. Not only was Mr. Locke deprived of presumptive notice as a result of the 
ambiguous statute, but the actual notice Mr. Locke received upon his first misdemeanor 
DUI conviction was insufficient to give him notice that upon this instant conviction, his 
case could be enhanced to a felony. The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of 
justice and to protect Mr. Locke's due process rights, this Court should find that a 
second DUI offense cannot be treated more harshly than a third offense. Accordingly, 
as is articulated herein, the district court erred in denying Mr. Locke's motion to dismiss 
because looking back from Mr. Locke's second DUI offense, he did not commit two 
other DUls which would have authorized the State to enhance the second DUI offense. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Locke respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 2010. 
- 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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